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In past years, popularity of Mobile Ad hoc Networks has led to the conception of 
Vehicular Ad hoc Networks. These networks must be highly secure before their 
implementation in real world. One of the vital aspects of these networks is routing 
protocol. Most of the protocols in VANET acknowledge all nodes in a network to be 
genuine by default. But there might be malicious nodes which can make the network 
vulnerable to various attacks. One such attacks is a black hole attack on AODV routing 
protocol. Because of its popularity, AODV and black hole attack are taken into 
consideration for this thesis. 
The aim of the thesis is to analyze effects of black hole attack on AODV and understand 
security need of routing protocols in VANET. The experimentation for this thesis was 
performed with 40, 60 and 80 nodes in network simulator (NS). The performance metrics 
such as average throughput, end to end delay and packet delivery ratio of each assumed 
scenarios under blackhole attack and with prevention method are calculated. The obtained 
calculations are compared to analyze the network performance of AODV.  
The results from the simulator demonstrate that overall network performance of AODV 
increased with black hole prevention algorithm in comparison to AODV under black hole 
attack only. Out of all the performance metrics that are used to analyze the network 
performance, the average throughput of AODV is significantly increased by 21 percent 
(approximately) when the mitigation algorithm is applied. The prevention approach used 
for the thesis can make AODV perform better against black hole attack. However, this 
approach is limited to a small to medium sized networks only.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The world of wireless system has been exponentially growing over the last decade. Wireless 
devices and wireless systems such as cell phones, PDAs, wireless computers, smartphones, 
etc. have been ubiquitous around our space in past years. Due to its convenient, portable and 
powerful nature, there is a rapid growth of such systems and hence ad-hoc networks are 
being more important in our lives. The definition of wireless ad-hoc network refers to the 
radio communication between various components of ad-hoc networks. These networks are 
infrastructure-less because of their mobile nature and therefore known as Mobile Ad-hoc 
Network (MANET). The popularity and convenient nature of MANET has inspired 
engineers and researchers to develop Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANET) where vehicles 
will be able to communicate with each other autonomously. Although VANET has not been 
implemented in real world, there has been plenty of researches and experimentations going 
on to make it perform better and safer.  
VANET, a subgroup of MANETs have similar features. The routing protocols used in 
MANETs such as AODV, DSR, ZRP and so on can also be used in VANET. Since most of 
these protocols were developed without regarding security, these protocols can be subject to 
various attacks and threats. An attack on the routing protocol can disrupt routing mechanism, 
eavesdropping of traffic data and even dismantle the whole network.   
 
1.1 Motivation 
People have always been commuting for work, study, shopping or for many different 
reasons. After the invention of cars, the mobility of humans has increased a lot. As a result, 
the traffic density has also increased. Such increase in traffic has certainly invited increase 
in number of road accidents and deaths. Because of such reasons, engineers are motivated to 
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develop an Intelligent Traffic System (ITS) which will reduce number of road fatalities, 
accidents and traffic jams. VANETs being a crucial part of ITS framework, it must be secure 
enough to fend off the possible threats and vulnerabilities.  
Although all the layers of VANET’s architecture must be robust and highly secure from 
attacks, the network layer is more prone to attacks and have higher degree of threats. Most 
of the routing protocols in MANETs have been used for over couple of decades, but their 
security is still under experimentation to make them more robust.  
One of the most popularly used routing protocol in ad-hoc network is AODV. This protocol 
was designed without addressing security which is a vital aspect of any systems. AODV 
packets are not authenticated, encrypted or integrity checked at all. This opens up a numerous 
possibility of AODV message fabrication and interpolation using wide range of attacks such 
as DOS (Denial of Service) attack, wormhole attack, replay attack, grey hole attack, etc. One 
of the widely used attacks on reactive protocol like AODV is a black hole attack. Black hole 
attack is performed by abusing the route discovery mechanism in AODV. An attacker node 
misinforms other genuine nodes of having a best route to a destination and absorbs all the 
packets toward itself and dropping them eventually resulting in DOS attacks. Such nature of 
this attack awfully degrades the network performance by adversely affecting throughput, 
latency, bandwidth and other network metrics. In a VANET system where message 
dissemination must be fast, consistent and secure, a black hole attack on such system can 
disrupt the communication resulting in road injuries, major car accidents or even deaths. 
Therefore, highlighting and analyzing security issues of AODV in VANET system is one of 
the major motivations of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Thesis Objectives 
The main objectives of this thesis are to analyze the black hole attack against AODV routing 
protocol in VANET system and develop black hole attack mitigation technique. The thesis 
also explores the features of VANET system and various possible threats that can be 
launched on VANET. This thesis specifically deals with black hole attack and how AODV 
protocol can be secured from the attack on VANET. The proposed black hole attack 
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mitigation method is then implemented on AODV protocol and its performance is evaluated 
through simulation. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists of many different chapters. The thesis structure is as follows: 
 
Chapter 2. Literature review presents ad-hoc networks and their definition, security 
requirements and applications. Apart from these, it also introduces different communication 
types and standards for ad-hoc networks. 
 
Chapter 3. Security problems in VANET explains possible threats and risks on different 
layers of VANET and the counter-measures to overcome those threats. 
 
Chapter 4. Proposed black hole mitigating method discusses the black hole attack on 
VANET and proposes a simple method for preventing the attack.  
 
Chapter 5. Implementation of AODV, black hole attack and proposed method describes 
various tools used, simulation environments and their setup. This chapter also illustrates 
parameters used for simulation and the performance metrics used for analyzing the 
simulation. 
    
Chapter 6: Results and Discussion explains the results obtained from the simulation for 
various scenarios. It also presents result calculation and further discusses the performance of 
AODV under difference scenarios. Apart from this, this chapter also describes the limitations 
of the simulations. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion summarizes the thesis work and highlights the importance of 
security of routing protocols for VANET system.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Ad-hoc networks: definition, features and applications 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks or MANETs have been a hot subject in a commercial research 
area. Previously used in military fields only, now gaining popularity in our daily lives. This 
network consists of many freely moving and independent nodes [1]. Every mobile node in 
this type of network acts as a router forwarding traffics to other targeted nodes [2]. A simple 
example of a MANET is shown in figure 2.1. 
   
    Fig 2.1: Mobile Ad hoc Network example 
 
The evolution of MANET has led to the conception of VANET (Vehicular Ad-hoc 
Network). VANET is a network of autonomous vehicles and the roadside infrastructures 
constantly communicating with each other over a Dedicated Short-Range Communication 
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(DSRC) channel [3]. VANET is a type or subgroup of MANET with some distinct features. 
The distinctive features of VANETs are [2]: 
• Highly Mobile: Compared to nodes in MANETs, VANET nodes are vehicles that 
move with high speed. This high mobility of VANET nodes causes many 
concerns. 
• Highly dynamic network topology: Because of their high mobility, the network 
topologies in VANET frequently changes.  This constant change in network 
topology made researchers and engineers to develop a special protocol that can 
perform well in highly dynamic and mobile network. 
• Time critical: The exchange of information between the nodes must be quick. The 
time is critical in VANET as the messages must be transmitted fast and within the 
limit. A late arrival of warning messages can have a dangerous effect in the 
network.    
• No power constraints: Unlike nodes in MANETs or other various networks, power 
is not a problem with nodes in VANETs. The nodes in VANETs are able to supply 
power to On Board Units (OBU) with the rechargeable battery present in a vehicle. 
• Huge network size: The network size of the VANET will be huge. The network 
can scale from a highway to a city.  
• Variable Network Density: VANET’s network density changes with the density 
of traffics. The network density is less in countryside and high in traffic jam.  
 
As mention earlier, a VANET system consists of vehicles and the road side units as shown 
in the figure below. The figure shows a continuous exchange of information between 
vehicles and towers (RSUs) [4].  
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    Fig. 2.2: Vehicular Ad hoc Network example 
 
2.2 Communication types in VANET 
VANET is a network of vehicles and infrastructure that are communicating with each other 
to provide safety on a road. VANET network consists of vehicles, which are mounted with 
on board units (OBU) and roadside units (RSU). These components are periodically sending 
and receiving messages with each other to form a safe, smooth and comfortable driving. 
VANET offers various application, which can be divided into safety application and non-
safety application. Safety application includes emergency brake, light warnings, blind spot 
warning, etc. whereas non-safety application are related to infotainment for example weather 
forecast, internet access, etc. [5]  
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 The communication types in VANET can be roughly differentiated into three types [6]. 
 
• Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) communication: In this type of communication, vehicles 
like cars, trucks, vans, etc. embedded with on board unit exchange information with 
each other in an ad-hoc fashion. With the help of V2V communication, a vehicle can 
be able to identify the movement and the location of other vehicles within its range.  
 
• Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communication: In V2I communication vehicles can 
communicate with road side units (RSU) like a wireless LAN. In other words, in this 
type of communication architecture, vehicles can exchange data with road side 
infrastructure for instance traffic lights, towers, access points, etc.   
 
• Hybrid Communication: Hybrid communication consists of both V2V and V2I 
communication. Vehicles are not only communicating with each other but also with 
RSUs in hybrid architecture. Figure 2.3 below depicts a communication flow 
between various components of a Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments 
(WAVE) system. WAVE is an architecture and standard developed for WAVE 
devices so that they can communicate in mobile environments.  
     
   Fig. 2.3: WAVE system components [8] 
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2.3 Standards and Protocol for VANET 
The distinct features of VANET demanded special standards which can perform well even 
in highly dynamic and highly mobile environment. This led to the development of WAVE 
(Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment) Standard. A WAVE standard is a radio 
communication standard, which was designed to provide interoperable and smooth services 
to VANET system. That means the wave devices can communicate with each other over a 
DSRC channel [8]. In US, Federal Communication Commission (FCC), has set aside a 75 
MHz spectrum of 5.9 GHz frequency band for WAVE whereas the European 
Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI) in Europe has divided a 75 MHz frequency 
channel into seven channels, 10MHz each. Out of seven channels, one channel is used as 
control channel (CCH) and the rest six channels are configured as service channels (SCH). 
The CCH is used for carrying critical information while other non-critical or less priority 
information is sent over SCH. The current proposed DSRC/WAVE protocol stack consists 
of IEEE802.11p and IEEE1609 family which is the most mature standard for WAVE [5].  
 
 
    Fig. 2.4: protocols in WAVE stack [8] 
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WAVE PHY (IEEE 802.11p): IEEE 802.11p is an enhancement to IEEE802.11 standard. In 
contrast to IEEE802.11, only small changes are proposed in IEEE 802.11p. Some difference 
between these two standards are that the IEEE 802.11p uses OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency 
Division Multiplexing) mechanism over 10 MHz channels in 5.9 GHz band whereas, IEEE 
802.11 or Wi-Fi uses OFDM PHY over a 20 MHz channels. The other difference is the 
carrier spacing in IEEE 802.11p is diminished to half than in IEEE 802.11 and the symbol 
length in 802.11 p is doubled to increase the signal strength from fading. IEEE 802.11p is 
implemented is PHY layer of WAVE architecture [8].  
 
 A distinct feature of this WAVE MAC is that it uses dynamic MAC addresses for OBUs. 
WAVE MAC (IEEE 802.11p/IEEE 1609.4): The MAC layer in WAVE should have the 
capability to handle the rapidly changing topologies induced by vehicles speed, huge density, 
and short connectivity and so on. Out of the many present radio standard, the simple yet 
popular and with high performance is IEEE 802.11 standard. In order to operate on multiple 
channels (SCHs and CCH), WAVE uses the concept of EDCA (Enhance Distributed 
Channel Access) technology. As shown in figure above, a WAVE reference model is 
composed of management plant and data plane. Data plane is responsible for providing data 
services while the management plane manages functions such as channel access, 
synchronization, etc. IEEE 1609.4 is used as an extension to IEEE 802.11p for channel 
management. Whenever LLC (logical link control) receives wave short message (WSM) or 
packets from higher layer, the LLC sublayer attaches an Ether Type value and forwards the 
data packet to the lower layers [11].  
 
WAVE Network and Transport layer (IEEE Std. 1609.3): This Standard is used in 
DSRC/WAVE for Networking Services which illustrate WAVE network layer. There are 
two WAVE devices known as Provider device and User device. Provider device broadcasts 
WAVE Service Advertisement (WSA) on SCH to inform user devices of their service 
availability. The exchange of messages is performed using either of two protocol stacks; 
WSMP (Wave Short Message Protocol) or IPv6 protocol [11].  
 
WSMP: Apart from IPv6 protocol operating on service channel, a WAVE network layer 
protocol that operate on both SCH as well as CCH. WSMP provides time critical and highly 
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important information. The primary objective for introduction of WSMP is to minimize 
overload. Broadcast Messages are traffic safety related messages and are broadcasted with 
the help of WSMs. These messages do not contain sensitive data and hence they are not 
encrypted but only signed by the sender’s certificate [12].   
 
WAVE Security services (IEEE Std. 1609.2): Safety is one of the critical aspects of a WAVE 
system. WAVE devices are prone to various vulnerabilities such as message spoofing, 
eavesdropping, message alteration and other various attacks. Such attack in one of the 
WAVE devices could cause a major accident. Hence, this Standard explains the various 
security measures implemented to secure the message exchange between WAVE devices.  
Apart from the above-mentioned standard, there are many other standard of 1609 family 
which are under research and experimentation for various purposes. For instance, 
IEEE1609.11 is the standard for electronic payment system, IEEE1609.12 will be used for 
Identifier Allocation [12] 
 
2.4 Security Requirements of VANET 
A system can be vulnerable to various system weaknesses which can be exploited by 
malicious element for various reasons. To make a system secure, security requirements of a 
system must be addressed. There are some security requirements of VANET system which 
are briefly described below. Also, the figure 2.5 shows the kinds of possible attacks that can 
compromise security requirements in VANET [13]. 
 
Authentication: one of the major and indisputable requirements of any system. A 
system must know the authenticity of all the participants of the system. Especially, in 
VANET which is vulnerable to various exploits, the authentication and identification 
becomes very important and necessary. In case of some attacks in VANET, powerful 
authentication approach can provide a strong legal proof against the intruder. Hence, 
to protect VANET system from attacks such as Sybil attack, position attack, 
tunneling, replay attack, message alteration and so on, Authentication process is an 
obvious requirement.  
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Availability: a system or a component in a system might face failure or some attacks. 
Such malicious condition of a component or a system should not affect other users or 
element of the system. In VANETs, all the applications and network should be 
available and function even when a n element of VANET is under attack. Some 
VANET nodes or infrastructure might face some attacks or issues which should not 
affect other nodes. In other words, the resources of VANET must be always available. 
To achieve the availability requirement in VANET, a robust, secure and tamper 
tolerant system design must be achieved. There are various attacks like Denial of 
Services (DOS) attack, Black hole attack, spamming attack, Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDOS) attacks, etc. that can have a serious impact on the availability 
requirement of VANET.  
 
Confidentiality: refers to the privacy of confidential information of a node or an 
infrastructure. The messages exchange between two components in VANET should 
not be exposed to third entity. Confidentiality can be achieved by using various 
encryption algorithms. In VANET, the safety messages do not possess sensitive data 
hence they are not encrypted. However, the user related information such as electronic 
payment, user’s identity and other personal information are kept confidential with the 
help of various cryptographic algorithms. Traffic analysis, Data spoofing and 
eavesdropping are some of the potential attacks on confidentiality in VANET. 
 
Integrity: protects messages from fabrication or interpolation. The messages sent and 
received by various entities of VANET should be kept intact. Which means the 
integrity of messages must be protected from being tampered by attackers. Integrity 
of messages can be affected by attacks such as Masquerade attack, Replay attack, 
Data alteration attacks, etc. To safeguard messages during transmission and reception, 
a secure protocol must be implemented. In VANET, IEEE1609.2 standard is used for 
security services.  
 
Non-Repudiation: one of the important security requirements of VANET. Non-
Repudiation ensures a sender or a receiver from denial of the transmitted data from 
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them [16]. VANET security requirements and the possible threats to those 
requirements is outlined in figure 2.5 below.  
 
   
   Fig. 2.5: VANET security requirements and possible threats [5] 
 
2.5 Routing Protocols 
Routing protocol for ad-hoc networks has been studied extensively in the last decades. Many 
ad-hoc routing protocols have been designed, developed and experimented with MANETs 
for different scenarios. Since VANET is a type of MANET, the routing protocols used in 
MANETs are assessed and evaluated to be implemented for VANETs too. Based on these 
routing protocol’s route updating method and position accusation, the routing protocols have 
been divided into five different categories [17]. They are as follows: 
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   Fig. 2.6: Routing protocols hierarchy [17] 
 
2.5.1 Broadcast Based Routing Protocols 
Broadcast based routing protocols broadcast the packet to all the nodes within its vicinity. If 
a node wants to send data to a destination node outside of its transmission range, then this 
method of broadcasting becomes handy. In VANET, mostly safety related data such as 
traffic condition, weather forecast, road traffic warning, etc. are broadcasted using broadcast-
based routing protocols [17].  
 
2.5.2 Cluster Based Routing Protocols 
Clustering is a method of grouping nodes with similar properties such as direction, speed, 
etc. into groups or cluster. Every cluster contains a cluster-head whose main function is to 
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transmit data between nodes using gateway nodes. Although network overhead grows with 
the use of Cluster based routing protocol, but it is highly scalable when it comes to huge 
networks. 
 
2.5.3 GeoCast Based Routing Protocols 
GeoCast Based Routing Protocol transfers data to a collection of nodes located in a certain 
geographic location. Even in rapidly changing network topology, these routing protocols 
deliver packets reliably. Some examples of these type protocols are DG-CASTOR, IVG, etc. 
 
2.5.4 Position Based Routing Protocols 
These protocols use location-based services like GPS (Global Positioning System) to 
transmit data from source to destination. Like other protocols, position-based routing 
protocols does not require route creation and therefore does not need route maintenance. The 
performance of such protocols is high in highways where the vehicles are travelling with 
huge speed. 
 
2.5.5 Topology Based Routing Protocols 
In these type of routing protocols, packet forwarding from source to destination is performed 
by utilizing the accessible information of links that inhabit within the network. These routing 
protocols have a capability of sending unicast, multicast and broadcast messages to other 
nodes. Apart from this, they consume less resources and low bandwidth. They are further 
sub grouped into three categories: 
• Proactive Routing 
• Reactive routing 
• Hybrid routing 
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The scope of this thesis is to study one of the popular reactive routing protocols, Ad hoc On-
demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol. Therefore, it only explains AODV 
routing protocol in details. The next topic discusses AODV and how it functions.   
 
 
2.6 AODV routing protocol 
AODV is an improvement of DSDV routing protocol and one of the most popular routing 
protocols in ad-hoc networks. AODV protocol utilizes the DSDV’s algorithm by reducing 
the broadcasts and establishing routes only when demanded or needed. Because of such 
characteristics of AODV, superfluous memory and route redundancy are curtailed and hence 
it is suitable for VANETs also.  
 
As in most of the reactive protocols, the data transmission occurs in AODV only in an on-
demand state. AODV performs unicast as well as multicast operations [11]. In General, 
AODV takes two steps for operation which are as follows: 
 
 
2.6.1 Route Discovery Process 
When a source node needs to establish a path to a destination node, the sending node floods 
the neighboring nodes with a Route Request (RREQ) message. This RREQ messages are 
broadcasted further by the neighboring nodes until the destination node is found or an 
intermediate node with a path to destination is found. To prevent loop, every node manages 
broadcastID and SequenceNumber. The broadcastID and sourceID identifies a RREQ packet 
uniquely. Therefore, every time a RREQ message is received by a node, the broadcastID is 
incremented. Multiple copies of RREQ message with same source IP address and 
broadcastID (RREQ ID) are received by the intermediate nodes, these RREQ packets are 
discarded without forwarding. Table 2.1 illustrates an AODV RREQ packet format [11]. 
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   Table 2.1: AODV RREQ packet format [11] 
 
Type Reserved Hop Count 
RREQ ID 
Destination IP address 
Destination Sequence Number 
Source IP address 
Source Sequence Number 
     
    
 
Once the destination node or an intermediate node with the route to destination is found, the 
node then creates a RREP (Route Reply) message and sends to the path back to the source 
node. The intermediate node receiving RREP message update their routing tables for the 
future use. The multiple duplicate copies of RREP message are discarded by comparing the 
broadcastID and source IP address. There is a possibility of receiving RREP message by 
source from multiple nodes. The source node updates its routing table with the new recent 
route by using the highest destination sequence number. The table below depicts an RREP 
packet format of AODV routing protocol [11]. 
 
 
   Table 2.2: AODV RREP packet format [11] 
 
Type Reserved Prefix size Hop Count 
Destination IP address 
Destination Sequence Number 
Source IP address 
Lifetime 
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2.6.2 Route maintaining process (Link failure) 
Every neighboring node in the network periodically exchange HELLO messages with each 
other. A sign of link failure can be absence of HELLO messages. If a node has not received 
HELLO messages until a designated time, then the node is marked as unreachable resulting 
in link failure. Once link failure occurs, every active neighbor is notified by sending Route 
Error (RERR) message. Router error message is initiated by the node closer to the  
Source node of the linked failure [11]. A simple example of AODV operations can be seen 
in the figure below. 
 
 
 
   Fig. 2.7: AODV Routing Protocol 
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Although VANET technology has improved and developed in recent times, there are still 
many security issues that exists in the system. Small error in a software application can cause 
serious consequences in the VANET system. The security aspect of VANET is a huge 
challenge to secure VANET from various attacks, privacy issues and information leakage.  
 
VANET still has many vulnerabilities which can be exploited by the attackers. Before 
adoption of VANET in real world, the different layers of VANET must be made secure. 
There are various threats and attacks that are present in different layers of VANET system. 
The topic below addresses some of the possible attacks on the WAVE layers in VANET and 
provides countermeasures briefly that can be applied to mitigate those security issues [21].  
 
3.1 Application layer (attacks and countermeasures) 
In VANET, an application Layer is responsible for the users’ information that are related to 
applications such as Email, Web, etc. The Applications on this layer use various application 
level protocols like HTTP, FTP, SMTP, etc. which can be exploited by the attacker for 
various reasons. Some of the main attacks on this layer in VANET are: 
 
Malicious Code: an attacker can circulate malicious code to other vehicles or to RSU 
to disrupt or impair an application in a VANET. Malicious code can include viruses, 
malware, spyware, Trojan horses, etc. which can have an adverse effect in the 
application layer. Using such codes, attacker can dismantle the system or gain user 
related information from an infected vehicle. 
 
Repudiation or message falsification attacks: in this type attack, an attacker captures 
the message via the wireless medium and manipulates the message and rebroadcast 
them. Altering content of messages can have an adverse effect on the system. Hence, 
such attack can cause misleading or invalidation of data in VANET. 
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Countermeasures 
Various anti-virus and anti-spyware software can be installed for VANET application which 
can protect against viruses and spywares. Programs like Firewall which monitors inbound 
and outbound traffics can be effective as a major countermeasure against application layer 
attacks. Apart from this, IDS (Intrusion Detection System) can be implemented to fight 
against spoofing and abnormal activity. 
 
 
3.2 Transport Layer (attacks and countermeasures) 
Transport layer in VANET deals with the end-to-end communication in a network. This 
layer facilitates with logical communication between application layer and network layer. 
There exist security concerns such as secure end-to-end communication, authentication etc. 
in transport layer for VANET. Some of the possible attacks that VANET confront on this 
layer are: 
  
Session Hijacking: an attacker gains control over the session between two entities. 
Since Authentication process is performed only at the beginning of a session. Once 
authenticated, the attacker masquerade as one of the authenticated members of the 
VANET network and seize control over the session.  
 
SYN flooding: TCP protocol uses three-way handshake to establish a connection 
between nodes. To establish a connection, a sender node sends SYN packet to the 
receiver along with Initial Sequence Number (ISN). Upon reception of SYN packet, 
the receiver node acknowledges by replying with ACK and SYN packet. Finally, the 
sender node sends an ACK packet and the connection is established. An attacker can 
generate numerous half-opened connections between two nodes known as SYN 
flooding. It is a type of DOS attack.  
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Countermeasures 
TCP is not appropriate for MANET. And hence not suitable for VANET too. Although TCP-
F (TCP feedback), ATP (Ad-hoc Transport Protocol), etc. are implemented in MANET, 
these protocols do not reduce the transport layer issues in MANET. Those protocols will 
also not be appropriate for VANET. However, some protocols such as TLS/SSL (Transport 
Layer Security/ Secure Socket Layer) helps prevent attacks like replay attack, masquerade 
attack and man-in-middle attack. 
 
 
3.3 Network Layer (attacks and countermeasures) 
Compared to Application layer attack in VANET, network layer attack can affect more nodes 
or even the whole network system. Especially in VANET, due to its dynamic topology, it is 
difficult to maintain routes. The components of VANET acts like a router and an attack on 
any of its component can dismantle the whole network. There are many routing protocols 
developed but each protocol has its own security issues. Basically, the attacks on routing 
protocol are divided into active attack and passive attack. 
 
Active attacks are those type of attacks, which halts the functioning of a routing protocols. 
Whereas passive attacks do not halt the operation of protocol but are launched to steal routing 
information or traffics. Some of the attacks on network layers are: 
 
Routing table overflow: this type of attack causes the overflow of routing table in 
VANET. In other words, an attacker advertises routes to nonexistent nodes to 
legitimate nodes. Because of this, routing protocol are not able to register new 
legitimate routes in their routing table. Proactive routing protocols such as DSFV, 
OLSR are affected by such attack as they update their routing information regularly. 
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Route cache poisoning: on-demand routing protocol such as DSR, AODV stores 
information about recent routes in their route cache. The information can be removed, 
changed or altered with incorrect information.   
 
Byzantine attacks: this type of attack occurs where an attacker gains complete control 
over most of the legitimate nodes of a VANET system. A victim node then performs 
many malicious activities like dropping packets, generating routing loops and so on 
which degenerates the routing function. Byzantine attacks are carried out by a single 
malicious attacker or a by a group of organized malicious nodes. 
 
Rushing attacks: has capability to pass forth route reply (RREP) packets faster than 
the authenticated nodes in a VANET. This creates an opportunity for the adversary to 
establish a path through it rather than the authenticated nodes. Mostly reactive 
protocols like AODV, DSR are the victim of such attack. This attack can result in the 
DOS attack and can dismantle a VANET network.  
 
Sybil attacks: In a VANET system, every node is authenticated and identified 
uniquely. A malicious node can create multiple virtual identities which is called Sybil 
attack. This attack creates an illusion among the legitimate nodes that those virtually 
created nodes exists physically. It is one of the attacks which cannot be detected 
easily.  
 
Sinkhole attacks: In a VANET, an attacker advertises to other nodes of having a better 
and legitimate route to the destination node. Once the source starts sending data via 
the route advertised by the attacker, forwarding of the data never occurs. Hence 
known as sinkhole attack.   
 
Wormhole attacks: It is one of the dangerous attacks that is very difficult to prevent. 
Wormhole can be very devastating even when the security scheme like authentication 
and encryption are implemented. Although this type of attack can be performed by a 
single node but usually, they are carried out by two or more malicious nodes. 
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Attackers create a tunnel known as wormhole link which captures traffics from one 
end and send them to another end.  
 
Black hole attacks: A black hole attack is an attack against integrity of network in 
VANET. This type of attack is launched in two steps. First, an attacker node misuse 
protocols like AODV by advertising itself of having a better route to destination node. 
The node captures packets and drops them in second steps. As black hole attack is the 
focus of the thesis, it is explained in detail in later chapter.   
 
Countermeasures  
The countermeasures of network layer attacks mostly depend on the type of routing protocol 
used in VANET. In general, various security mechanism such as cryptography-based 
algorithm, trust-based approach can be implemented to defend against attacks on network 
layer. Since this thesis deals with the black hole attack on AODV routing protocol, a 
sequence based approach is adopted and it is explored in details in chapter 4.   
 
 
3.4 MAC layer (attack and countermeasures)  
The MAC layer (also physical layer) in WAVE uses IEEE 802.11p standard. This standard 
makes use of CSMA/CA to supply channel access and curtail collisions. An Attack on MAC 
layer can result in the disruption of the channel access mechanism. It can cause exhaustion 
of bandwidth and even power which in turn produce low throughput in network. Some of 
the major attacks on MAC protocols such as IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11p are DOS and 
DDOS attack. According to Zhou, Wu and Nettles [1] two MAC layer DOS attacks can be 
carried out namely single adversary attack (SAA) and colluding adversary attack (CAA). 
 
Countermeasures 
SAA attack on MAC can be defended using the proposed packet-by-packet authentication 
scheme in [1]. 
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CAA attack can be prevented using the approaches like distance adjustment, protecting flow 
of traffic, etc.  
 
3.5 Physical layer (attacks and countermeasures) 
There are various attacks that can be launched on physical layers. For instance, jamming, 
eavesdropping, interference, etc. A malicious node can perform eavesdropping by 
intercepting the messages over the air using special receivers. The radio waves transmitted 
by nodes antenna can be jammed and interfered by strong signals generated from transmitter. 
This can cause the messages to be discarded or corrupt.  
 
Countermeasures 
Spread spectrum technique adjusts radio frequency in a random fashion which creates 
difficulty to jam radio signals. Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and Direct 
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) technique can be implemented to mitigate physical layer 
attack.  
4. PROPOSED METHOD TO MITIGATE BLACK HOLE 
 
4. PROPOSED METHOD TO MITIGATE BLACK 
HOLE 
As mentioned before, most of the routing protocols for Ad-hoc networks were developed 
long time ago without considering their security mechanism. Hence, those routing protocols 
are prone to various attacks. As black hole attack mitigation in AODV routing protocol is 
one of the objectives of the thesis, a sequence number based black hole mitigation method 
is developed and presented in this chapter. Existing approaches on black hole prevention on 
AODV are also studied in this chapter. 
4.1 Black hole attack (on AODV) 
Black hole attack is a kind of attack where a malicious node attempts to capture all or most 
of the traffics toward itself by broadcasting bogus routing information to its neighboring 
nodes. In AODV routing protocol, when a node wants to send data to a destination node, it 
initiates a route discovery process by sending RREQ packets to its neighboring nodes. When 
a node with malicious intent receives the route request (RREQ) packet, it then replies with a 
highest sequence number claiming that it possesses a best route to destination. After the 
source node has received RREP from the attacker node, it starts sending data to the attacker 
node. Once the attacker node starts receiving data, it can perform selective forwarding or 
just dropping all the data.  
 
As it can be seen in the figure below, node A(source) wants to send data to node 
H(destination), it sends RREQ packets to its neighboring nodes B, C and D. Node B, being 
an attacker node sends route reply packet (RREP) with highest sequence number. Source 
node A also receives RREP via H-F-D-A and H-E-C-A. But source node A finds route via 
B to have better metric than other routes and hence forwards all the data via node B. Node 
B drops all the data it has received without forwarding the data to its neighboring nodes. 
 
 
4. PROPOSED METHOD TO MITIGATE BLACK HOLE 
 
 
 
   Fig. 4.1: Black hole attack 
 
4.2 Existing black hole attack mitigation schemes 
Trust based Routing 
Fidel Thachil and K.C. Shet et al. [29] proposes a trust based approach for AODV protocol 
to mitigate black hole attack. In this approach, all nodes maintain a trust value of their 
neighboring nodes by listening to their neighbors promiscuously. The trust value is 
calculated dynamically. Whenever the trust value of any node drops below a predefined 
threshold trust, the node is supposed to be a malicious one and thus it is averted from route.  
 
IDS (Intrusion Detection System) 
Adnan Nadeem and Michael P. Howarth et al. [28] explains in their survey various intrusion 
and detection approaches than can be implemented in MANETs. Based on the detection 
method application, the survey categories the intrusion detection techniques into three main 
classes. They are Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection (ABID), Knowledge-Based Intrusion 
Detection (KBID) and Specification-Based Intrusion Detection (SBID). 
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Watch Dog Mechanism 
This mechanism helps to identify any misbehaving nodes in a network [27]. The basic 
working principal of watchdog mechanism is by watching the neighboring node with the 
help of previously sent messages in the buffer. Whenever a node forwards a message, the 
watchdog makes sure that the next node in the network way also forwards the message. The 
watchdog achieves this process by promiscuously listening to the nodes within its range. 
Whenever a watchdog finds a message not being forwarded by any of its neighboring node 
or forwarded by modification, it is believed to be misbehaving. And if a node only receives 
packets but doesn’t forward the packets or message, then the node is marked as a malicious 
node.  
 
ERDA (Enhance Route Discovery for AODV) 
Kamarularifin A.J, Zaid A. and Jamalul-Lail A M. et al. [34] proposes an enhanced method 
of route discovery in AODV protocol by addressing low overheads. This method consists of 
two-part process. In first part, a new parameter is added in order to secure routing table 
update. In second part, Receive Reply packets stored in a table is inspected to remove any 
malicious nodes. ERDA is secure and has low latency compared to other methods.  
 
Secure AODV (SAODV) 
A Secure AODV or SAODV is another approach to make AODV routing protocol more 
secure. It is an enhancement of AODV protocol. The probability of attack in SAODV is 
reduced by waiting and checking the RREP packets from all the neighboring nodes to find a 
secure route.   
 
4.3 Sequence number based black hole attack mitigation 
In a network using AODV, sending of packets from a source node occurs by initiating a 
RREQ packet to its neighboring nodes in search of a best route to destination. The 
neighboring nodes forwards the packet further to other intermediate nodes until a best route 
is found. Once the destination node is found, it replies with RREP packet. There may be 
different route to destination. So, to determine the best route to destination, AODV considers 
4. PROPOSED METHOD TO MITIGATE BLACK HOLE 
 
highest destination sequence number received from reply packet. If in this network, there is 
a black hole node presence, then whenever it receives the RREQ packet, it can send a 
counterfeit RREP packet with highest sequence number to the source node. Now, the source 
node ignores all other routes and chooses this route to be the best path to destination and 
starts sending data. The black hole node receives data and drops them without forwarding 
them to further nodes.  
 
The simulation area used for this thesis is 1200 meters square. The different number of nodes 
(40, 60 and 80) are used assuming different nodes density scenarios and two nodes are 
created to act as black hole nodes. Considering the above-mentioned behavior of black hole 
attack, the two black hole nodes are programmed to send the largest destination sequence 
number upon reception of RREQ packet and drop the data packets. In other words, malicious 
nodes send bogus RREP packets with largest destination sequence number claiming to have 
a better route to destination node.  
 
Knowing how black hole attack attracts and captures the data, the detection of a black hole 
presence in a network can be marked by checking the largest destination sequence number. 
It can be assumed that if a node can skip the node which sends largest destination sequence 
number then black hole attack can be prevented.  
 
There are numerous existing approaches and schemes for black hole attack prevention in 
AODV. Some of those existing schemes are mentioned in the section earlier. Most of the 
existing schemes are complex in nature and therefore requires huge overhead and high 
computational power. The approach adopted for this thesis differs from those existing 
method in some ways. One of the contrasting differences is its simplicity. As explained 
previously, the approach used is exclusively based on sequence number. Therefore, it 
requires less computational power than other existing schemes. However, in comparison to 
other prevention methods, this method can only be adopted in a small to medium sized 
network. Despite of this limitation, its simple algorithm and effectiveness made it a better 
choice for this thesis work.   
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To implement the prevention algorithm for this thesis, nodes are programmed to check for 
the destination sequence number received from RREP packet and the current sequence 
number in the routing table. Upon reception of RREP packet, all nodes check for the 
destination sequence number received from the neighboring nodes and the current sequence 
number in their routing table and calculates the difference between them (destination 
sequence number and the current sequence number). If it finds the difference between these 
two sequence number to be less than the predefined value (value used is 200 in this case), 
nodes update their routing table with the received destination sequence number and the 
normal AODV process is continued. But, if the difference is greater than the defined value, 
then the node with greater sequence number is assumed to be a black hole and is ignored and 
new route is searched. This is how the prevention of black hole attack is implemented for 
this thesis project without disturbing the traditional AODV routing method.  
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Fig. 4.2: Proposed Algorithm flowchart 
 
 
 
The flowchart above portrays the steps of the black hole prevention method implemented in 
this thesis project which are briefly explained below. 
 
Step 1:  Normal AODV process take place.; source nodes initializes route discovery process 
by sending RREQ packets to its neighboring nodes.  
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Step 2: Immediate nodes upon RREQ packet reception, forwards the packet until a suitable 
route to destination is found.  
 
Step 3: Once RREQ reaches to destination or a suitable route to destination is found, 
immediate nodes now receive RREP packet from the destination node. 
 
Step 4: Received destination sequence number from RREP packets are checked against the 
current sequence number in the node’s routing table. It now checks the difference between 
these sequence number with the assigned value X (assigned value for the simulation is 200). 
 
Step 5: If the difference between the sequence number is greater than X: 
  Do not update the routing table and go to Step 3. 
 Else: 
  Update the routing table with new sequence number received from RREP. 
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ATTACK MITIGATION METHOD 
This chapter of the thesis explains various simulation tools used such as SUMO, MOVE and 
network simulator. Apart from that, it discusses environment setups used for implementation 
of the black hole mitigation method. It also outlines the performance metrics used to study 
results obtained from the simulation. 
 
5.1 Simulation Tools 
To implement the black hole mitigation technique discussed in earlier chapter and to observe 
its effectiveness, it must be tested in a simulated environment. For simulation of nodes 
mobility, SUMO is adopted. The simulation area for the nodes used is 1200m x 1200m and 
different number of vehicles (40, 60 and 80) are used in different simulation. To create 
mobility model (vehicles, roads etc.) for the simulation in sumo, MOVE tool is used which 
provides users to rapidly create mobility models. Thus generated mobility models is then 
integration in network simulator to simulate different assumed scenarios and to produce 
simulation results. Further details about the tools are discussed in the sub topics below. 
 
5.1.1 Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) 
Sumo is an open and free traffic simulation suite. It allows the simulation of the real-world 
traffic entities, such as vehicles, traffic lights, roads maps and others. According to official 
sumo’s webpage, the features of sumo are as follows [37]: 
 
• Microscopic simulation - vehicles, pedestrians and public transport are modeled 
explicitly 
• Online interaction – control the simulation with TraCI 
• Simulation of multimodal traffic, e.g., vehicles, public transport and pedestrians 
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• Time schedules of traffic lights can be imported or generated automatically by 
SUMO 
• No artificial limitations in network size and number of simulated vehicles 
• Supported import formats: OpenStreetMap, VISUM, VISSIM, NavTeq 
• SUMO is implemented in C++ and uses only portable libraries 
   
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1: SUMO simulation area 
 
There are many traffic simulations tools like TraNS (Traffic and Network Simulation 
Environment), SUMO, STRAW, etc. which are used to generate realistic vehicular mobility. 
Most of these tools can be coupled with network simulator to simulate a realistic road 
traffics. SUMO is used in this thesis context. Figure 5.1 above and figure 5.2 below shows 
simulation area of vehicles in sumo.  
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Fig. 5.2: Vehicles in sumo 
 
This thesis deals with the vehicular network, traffic mobility is carried out using the sumo 
suite. For mobility model, nine nodes (junctions in sumo’s context) have been created with 
an equidistance of 600 meters along with 12 edges with two lanes, which are shown in figures 
above. The nodes, edges, nodes flow, and other can be created manually using sumo alone. 
But MOVE tool makes it easier and quicker to generate the mobility model. Therefore, 
MOVE tool is adopted for the simulation for this thesis.  
 
5.2.1 MOVE: MObility model generator for VEhicular network 
It is very important to simulate and evaluate a VANET environment with various protocols 
in a real-world scenario. The more real a simulation gets, the immaculate a testing or 
evaluation gets. Most of the network simulator such as NS-3, OPNET, OMNET++, and NS-
2 provides general simulation of sequence of events but they have to be customized in order 
to simulate VANET. Hence, in this thesis, MOVE tool is used to create real world mobility 
of vehicles. MOVE tool is developed on top SUMO which means that this tool facilitates 
the prompt mobility model generation and the scenarios creation and then integrated into 
SUMO environment [32].  
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MOVE tool is basically written in java programming language and runs on top of open 
source SUMO as mentioned earlier. MOVE mainly consists of two elements: Map editor 
and Vehicle movement editor. Using the map editor, map topology can be created manually, 
randomly or imported real maps from the database from freely available TIGER 
(Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing) database (US census 
Bureau).  
 
     
Fig. 5.3: MOVE tool 
 
The other component i.e. Vehicle Movement editor that provides vehicles movement in the 
map created via Map editor. Vehicle movement can be created automatically, can be 
generated manually or using bus timetable generator.  
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The mobility model implemented for this thesis has 9 junctions and junction 1 and 5 (node0 
and node5 in MOVE’s context) has traffic lights. The lanes create is a two-way lane with 
maximum speed limit of 50 km/s except for lane number 11. Similarly, random flow of 
vehicles from different directions is defined using the MOVE tool. Finally, after all the 
necessary parameters provided to MOVE, it creates a mobility model and it is integrated in 
network simulator for simulation.  Figure 5.4 and 5.5 shows nodes and edges created using 
MOVE tool. 
 
 
 
    
Fig. 5.4: map nodes editor in MOVE 
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   Fig. 5.5: Roads editor in MOVE 
 
 
5.3.1 Network Simulator (NS) 
Carrying out experimentation on various networks and system in real world can be 
unfeasible, impractical or expensive. Simulation of such system using simulation tool can be 
efficient, economical and even secure. There are many network simulation tools available 
for simulation of various computer networks, one of them is Network simulator (NS). It is a 
discrete event simulator aimed at stimulating different kinds of networks for research [35].  
 
For this thesis project, one of the popular network simulation tools known as NS2 is used. 
After the completion of a simulation, NS2 generates two files with .nam and .tr extensions. 
NAM files are used to visualize the simulation in NS2 as shown in figures below whereas 
trace file (.tr) is used to analyze the simulation result. The result can then be plotted with 
gnuplot, xgraph or other tools. However, for this thesis project, awk scripts were used to 
calculate average throughput, average end-to-end delay and packet delivery ratio. Thus, 
obtained data was then plotted using LibreOffice Calc. 
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   Fig. 5.6: NS2 simulation  
 
The black nodes seen in the figures are normal nodes, green nodes represent sender and 
receiver nodes whereas red nodes are black hole nodes. 
   
   Fig. 5.7: nodes moving in ns2 
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The primary goal of this thesis is to understand and analyze black hole attack on AODV 
routing protocol and provide an approach to mitigate it. To achieve the primary goal, various 
scenarios have been assumed for simulation. As explained earlier, the simulation consists of 
different number of nodes (40, 60 and 80) in each scenario including two black hole nodes. 
In first scenario, the VANET simulated with different number of nodes (40, 60 and 80) 
without including any black hole nodes. In second scenario, two of the vehicles in ns2 were 
modified as black hole node and inserted in the simulation with other normal nodes. In each 
simulation, the number of nodes were differed except for the two black hole nodes.  The 
effects of black hole nodes on 40, 60 and 80 nodes are evaluated. Similarly, in the last 
scenario, AODV was modified to use the mitigation method and the simulation was carried 
out with different number of nodes. Using the modified AODV, the two black hole nodes 
and varying number of nodes, the output of the simulation was evaluated. There were many 
parameters such as channel type, propagation model, network interface type, etc. were used 
which are discussed in next section.  
 
 
5.5 Simulation environment and setup 
The simulation of the VANET scenarios are implemented in NS-2.35. The topological area 
for the scenarios is 1200 meter by 1200 meters. The propagation model used was 
TwoRayGround whereas the network interface type used was wirelessPhy. TCP 
(Transmission Control Protocol) traffics was used to send data from source to destination 
nodes. Two nodes were used as source nodes and two as destination nodes. The simulation 
was done for 400 seconds of the simulation time. 
 
Simulation was conducted in different conditions. First 40, 60 and 80 vehicles were used in 
normal condition and their average throughput, packet delivery ratio (PDR) and end-to-end 
(e2e) delay were calculated. In second scenario, two malicious nodes were inserted in 40, 60 
and 80 vehicles topology and their respective average throughput, PDR and e2e delay was 
read. Similarly, in last scenario, AODV protocol was modified to ignore the malicious nodes 
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(nodes with greater sequence number) and routing was performed under 40, 60 and 80 nodes 
and again, their respective performance metrics were taken. The detailed information about 
the simulation parameters used are shown in the table, 
 
 
 
 
   Table 5.1: simulation parameters  
 
Parameters Value 
Network Simulator Version  NS 2.35 
Operating System  Linux Mint 18.2 (Sonya) 
Channel Type Wireless 
Propagation Model TwoRayGround 
Network interface type WirelessPhy 
Interface queue type DropTail/PriQueue 
Antenna model OmniAntenna 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Number of nodes 40,60,80 
Simulation time 400s 
Simulation Area 1200m X 1200m 
Traffic type TCP 
Maximum node speed  60km/hr. 
 
5.4 Performance metric 
The performance of a network can be determined by various metrics such as packet delay, 
average throughput, loss, error, bandwidth, etc. Based on these metrics, robustness and 
reliability of a network can analyzed. To analyze the network performance in this thesis, 
three metrics are used which are described below.  
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Average throughput: is a measure of aggregated amount of data that are transmitted in a 
given time. Let say, Preceived is the amount of received packets in total time T, then average 
throughput is calculated as 
  
                                      𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑
𝑇
×
8
1000
 
  
 
Average End-to-end Delay: It is the average time taken by a packet to travel from source to 
destination in a network. Let’s assume, Ptotal is the total number of packets sent from source 
node at time Tsent and Treceived be the time taken for a packet to reach destination node. Hence 
Delay D is calculated as follows: 
     𝐷 = 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 − 𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
If Dtotal be the total delay. An average end-to-end is a total delay divided by total number of 
packets sent from source to destination. 
                                      
    𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
∑𝐷
𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
 
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): is a ratio of the total number of sent packets by a source node 
to the total received packets by a destination node. Let say if Psent be the total packet sent by 
source and Preceived be the total packets received by destination node, then PDR is calculated 
as: 
 
    𝑃𝐷𝑅 =
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑
 
 
 
6. RESULT ANALYSIS 
6. RESULT ANALYSIS 
This section describes the results obtained from the simulations. The results include the 
network performance of AODV in different scenarios mentioned in earlier chapters. Thus 
obtained results are then used for analyzing the performance calculation and to show how 
AODV routing protocol is affected under black hole attack and after implementing the 
proposed algorithm. The calculation also depicts the use and limitations of the prevention 
method implemented. 
  
6.1 Results for AODV (without black hole) 
The table 6.1 and the figure 6.1 below depicts the network performance of AODV in normal 
condition (without black hole). The result suggests that the average throughput is decreasing 
with the increase in number of nodes whereas the packet delivery ratio seems to increase 
slightly with the increase in number of nodes. When 60 nodes were used, the end-to-end 
delay was slightly increased. But there is a rapid increase in end-to-end delay when 80 nodes 
were placed.  
 
 
  Table 6.1: AODV in normal condition 
 
Number of nodes Average throughput Packet delivery Ratio End-to-end delay 
40 395.39 98.00 219.14 
60 384.53 98.20 219.34 
80 331.60 98.30 251.78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. RESULT ANALYSIS 
The network performance of AODV is shown as a graph below. 
 
 
 
    
     Fig. 6.1: performance of AODV 
 
 
6.2 Results for AODV under black hole attack 
The table 6.2 shows the performance of AODV under black hole attack. The table shows 
that the average throughput of AODV has decreased drastically under black hole in 
comparison to normal condition (without black hole). The average throughput further 
decreases with the increase in number of nodes. Similarly, the packet delivery ratio has also 
decreased with the increase in nodes under attack. As for end-to-end delay, when 40 nodes 
were used, the end-to-end delay was approx. 236 milliseconds (ms), the delay is decreased 
to 222 ms when 60 nodes were used. Again when 80 nodes were used, the delay increased 
to 273ms. 
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   Table 6.2: Result for AODV under black hole 
 
Number of nodes Average throughput Packet delivery Ratio End-to-end delay 
40 244.12 96.50 236.03 
60 234.06 96.80 221.90 
80 191.91 95.47 272.50 
    
 
Similarly, the graph for AODV under a black hole attack is plotted from the table above.  
 
 
 
    
   Fig. 6.2: Graph for AODV under black hole 
 
6.3 Result for AODV with the mitigation method 
After the simulation of AODV under black hole attack, AODV was modified to use the 
proposed algorithm. Table 6.3 shown below shows the results obtained from the simulation 
after modifying AODV.  From the result, it is seen that when 40 nodes were used, average 
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throughput of modified AODV was approx. 232 Kbps. The average throughput increases to 
319 Kbps (approx.) with 60 nodes and 263 Kbps (approx.) with 80 nodes. The packet 
delivery ratio for 40 nodes is around 97 percent. With increase in nodes number to 60, the 
packet delivery ratio drops to 96.5 but again increases to 98.1 percent with increase in node 
number i.e. 80. Similarly, the end-to-end delay for 40 and 60 nodes is 224 ms (approx.) and 
222 ms (approx.). But the delay increases to 257 ms (approx.) when 80 nodes were used. 
 
  Table 6.3: Result for AODV with proposed method 
 
Number of nodes Average throughput Packet delivery Ratio End-to-end delay 
40 232.41 97.20 224.20 
60 318.90 96.50 221.94 
80 262.70 98.16 256.52 
 
 
The graph of the result obtained is shown in the figure below. 
 
 
 
   Fig. 6.3: AODV with proposed method 
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6.4 Discussion and Analysis 
The results obtained from the simulations have provided important information about the 
black hole attack and what negative consequences it has on the performance of AODV 
routing protocol. The simulation data is further compared based on the performance metrics 
as shown below. 
 
   Fig. 6.4: average throughput comparison 
 
The figure 6.4 illustrates the average throughput of AODV in different scenarios. The 
average throughput of AODV under black hole attack is significantly decreased. With the 
increase in number of nodes or vehicles, the average throughput has dropped down under 
black hole. From the result, it can be interpreted that the proposed method used has provided 
better average throughput when the network size increases. However, in case of 40 nodes, 
the average throughput for AODV with the mitigation approach has decreased compared to 
the average throughput under blackhole attack (and without mitigation method). This 
unexpected result can be inferred to be because of the random movement of nodes 
(configured via sumo) in NS2 and the nodes proximity in the simulation area. Under this 
scenario, when 40 nodes were used in a simulation area of 1200 m2, the nodes could have 
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been out of range or signal strength could have been weak at that instance because of a 
smaller number of nodes moving randomly than in other scenarios (i.e. 60 and 80 nodes). 
 
 
 
  
  
  Fig. 6.5:  packet delivery ratio comparison 
 
 
Figure 6.5 represents the packet delivery ratio of AODV in different scenarios. The figure 
shows that packet delivery ratio of the AODV with proposed algorithm (modified AODV) 
has better ratio for 40 and 80 nodes. However, for 60 nodes, the packet delivery ratio (PDR) 
seems to have decreased slightly when mitigation method was used in comparison to 
blackhole attack (without mitigation method). There are many variables that can affect PDR. 
In this case, the speed and node movement may have caused constant change of signal range 
and possibly link, or signal breakdown could have caused, eventually reducing throughput. 
Generally, throughput is directly proportional to PDR and it is also reduced in this case. 
 
 As for end-to-end delay is concerned, figure 6.6 shows that the delay has improved when 
AODV is modified with proposed algorithm.  
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Fig. 6.6: end to end delay comparison 
 
 
Analyzing all the bar graphs, it can be assumed that the modified AODV with the proposed 
algorithm has overall produced better results, but the results are always less than the AODV 
in normal situation. The reason for this could be the extra computation, AODV has to 
perform to check for the sequence number.  
 
 
6.5 Limitations of proposed method 
The proposed algorithm for this thesis works by preventing or ignoring the unanticipated 
huge sequence number (destination) received via RREP packet. This method is limited to 
ignoring black hole attacks only which sends large destination sequence number to establish 
a route towards itself. This method lacks the black hole identification and authentication of 
6. RESULT ANALYSIS 
all the nodes in the network. Despite of proposed method implementation, the black hole 
attacker nodes are still receiving RREQ packets from the neighbors and hence their threats 
are not eradicated completely. 
The method for preventing black hole attack in this thesis checks for the source and 
destination sequence number and if the difference is greater than 100, it is a black hole and 
therefore, the routing table is not updated. In other words, only the nodes with the sequence 
number difference of less than 100 can take part in routing process. In a huge network with 
huge number of nodes, using this approach may not be able to mitigate the attacker nodes 
completely. Hence, the proposed method has a limited application and scope to a smaller 
network. Apart from these, the proposed method does not have a capacity to detect other 
form of attacks.
7. CONCLUSION 
7. CONCLUSION 
An insecure VANET system can lead to serious injuries, fatal accidents and even deaths. 
Therefore, VANET system must be highly secure and robust and be capable of preventing 
possible danger that can occur because of security failure. This thesis reviews the routing 
protocols that can be used in VANET, the possible threats on those protocols and the 
available counter-measures to those threats.  
 
This thesis demonstrates the emphasis of security aspect of routing protocols by using 
AODV routing protocol and the effects it can have on performance of AODV routing 
protocol when black hole attack is launched. It also discusses the counter-measures for black 
hole attack and illustrates a simple sequence number based black hole prevention method. 
In order to achieve the objective of this thesis, the simulation was performed in network 
simulator and other mobility tools. Various scenarios were assumed with different number 
of nodes and the simulation data was evaluated. Upon analyzing the results collected from 
the simulation, it shows that the black hole attack can have negative impact on the network 
performance. The average throughput and packet delivery ratio decreased under black hole 
attack and the end-to-end delay was increased.  
 
The result from the simulation shows that the overall average throughput and average packet 
delivery ratio of AODV in all scenarios (under black hole attack) were 223,69 kbps 
(approx..) and 0.963 (approx..) respectively. When the prevention algorithm was 
implemented, the aggregate average throughput and average packet delivery ratio of AODV 
were increased to 271,33 kbps and 0.972 (approx..). Therefore, it can be said that the 
prevention method was able to increase the average throughput of AODV by remarkable 
21,3% in comparison with black hole attack without prevention method.  
 
The approach implemented to mitigate black hole was able to prevent effects of black hole 
attack and better the overall performance of AODV routing protocol especially average 
throughput to a convincing amount. Although the prevention method increased the overall 
AODV performance against black hole, this method was not able to perform as in the normal 
scenario. Apart from this, this method will be inefficient if the difference between the 
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destination sequence number and the current sequence number is too large. Hence, it is 
limited to a small to medium sized network. Finally, it can be concluded that for a better 
network performance, a secure protocol plays a significant role. A routing protocols for 
VANET must be immune from various attacks for a smooth, secure and safe traffic 
condition. Hence, security of routing protocols in VANET is very important. 
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 APPENDIX 
# 
================================================================
====== 
# Define options 
# 
================================================================
====== 
set val(chan)   Channel/WirelessChannel        ;# channel type 
set val(prop)   Propagation/TwoRayGround        ;# radio-propagation model 
set val(netif)  Phy/WirelessPhy        ;# network interface type 
set val(mac)    Mac/802_11        ;# MAC type 
set val(ifq)    Queue/DropTail/PriQueue        ;# interface queue type 
set val(ll)     LL        ;# link layer type 
set val(ant)    Antenna/OmniAntenna        ;# antenna model 
set val(ifqlen) 50        ;# max packet in ifq 
set val(nn)     96       ;# number of mobilenodes 
set val(rp)     AODV        ;# routing protocol 
 
set opt(x)      1252         ;# x coordinate of topology 
set opt(y)      1252        ;# y coordinate of topology 
set stopTime      199.00 
 
# 
================================================================
====== 
# Main Program 
# 
================================================================
====== 
#  
# Initialize Global Variables 
#  
set ns_ [new Simulator] 
set tracefd [open /home/ramzan/VANET/simpleBHprev.tr w] 
$ns_ trace-all $tracefd 
 
set namtrace [open /home/ramzan/VANET/simpleBHprev.nam w] 
$ns_ namtrace-all-wireless $namtrace $opt(x) $opt(y) 
 
# set up topography object 
set topo    [new Topography] 
$topo load_flatgrid $opt(x) $opt(y) 
 
#  
# Create God 
#  
 create-god $val(nn) 
 
# Configure node 
 
set chan_1_ [new $val(chan)] 
$ns_ node-config  -ad-hocRouting $val(rp) \ 
    -llType $val(ll) \ 
    -macType $val(mac) \ 
    -ifqType $val(ifq) \ 
    -ifqLen $val(ifqlen) \ 
    -antType $val(ant) \ 
    -propType $val(prop) \ 
    -phyType $val(netif) \ 
    -topoInstance $topo \ 
    -agentTrace ON \ 
    -routerTrace ON \ 
    -macTrace ON \ 
    -movementTrace ON \ 
    -channel $chan_1_   
 
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn)} {incr i} { 
  set node_($i) [$ns_ node] 
  $node_($i) random-motion 0 ;# disable random motion 
} 
 
# nodes colors 
$node_(10) color "red" 
$ns_ at 0.1 "$node_(10) color red" 
$node_(12) color "red" 
$ns_ at 0.1 "$node_(12) color red" 
$node_(4) color green” 
$ns_ at 0.1 "$node_(4) color green " 
$node_(2) color green 
$ns_ at 0.1 "$node_(2) color green " 
$node_(16) color green” 
$ns_ at 0.1 "$node_(16) color green " 
$node_(8) color green 
$ns_ at 0.1 "$node_(8) color green " 
 
 
 
 
#  
# Provide initial (X,Y, for now Z=0) co-ordinates for mobilenodes 
#  
#predefine node in NAM   
  # ID of SUMO: flow0_0 
$node_(0) set X_ 19.95 
 $node_(0) set Y_ 624.0500000000001 
$node_(0) set Z_ 0.0 
$node_(0) setdest 19.95 624.0500000000001 1 
  # ID of SUMO: flow1_0 
$node_(1) set X_ 1219.95 
$node_(1) set Y_ 22.549999999999997 
$node_(1) set Z_ 0.0 
$node_(1) setdest 1219.95 22.549999999999997 1 
  # ID of SUMO: flow0_1 
$node_(2) set X_ 19.95 
$node_(2) set Y_ 624.0500000000001 
$node_(2) set Z_ 0.0 
$node_(2) setdest 19.95 624.0500000000001 1 
  # ID of SUMO: flow1_1 
$node_(3) set X_ 1219.95 
$node_(3) set Y_ 22.549999999999997 
$node_(3) set Z_ 0.0 
$node_(3) setdest 1219.95 22.549999999999997 1 
. 
. 
. 
. 
truncated  
. 
. 
. 
$ns_ at 198.0 "$node_(43) setdest 619.95 625.5799999999999 10.32" 
$ns_ at 198.0 "$node_(41) setdest 619.95 651.4799999999999 11.88" 
$ns_ at 198.0 "$node_(39) setdest 619.95 680.15 14.10" 
$ns_ at 198.0 "$node_(33) setdest 619.95 710.5899999999999 16.31" 
$ns_ at 198.0 "$node_(31) setdest 619.95 761.55 19.88" 
$ns_ at 198.0 "$node_(21) setdest 619.95 1199.44 0.09" 
$ns_ at 198.0 "$node_(12) setdest 619.95 1206.9499999999998 0.00" 
$ns_ at 198.0 "$node_(17) setdest 616.65 1206.94 0.00" 
 
 
#black hole 
$ns_ at 10.0 "[$node_(10) set ragent_] bh" 
$ns_ at 10.0 "[$node_(12) set ragent_] bh" 
 
 
# Setup traffic flow between nodes 
Agent/TCP set window_ 20 
Agent/TCP set packetSize_ 1000 
Agent/TCP set maxburst_ 0 
Agent/TCP set maxcwnd_ 0 
Agent/UDP set packetSize_ 1000 
Application/Traffic/CBR set rate_ 64Kb 
 Application/Traffic/CBR set random_ NO 
Application/Traffic/CBR set maxpkts_ 2280000 
 
set tcp0 [new Agent/TCP] 
$tcp0 set class_ 2 
set sink0 [new Agent/TCPSink] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(2) $tcp0 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(8) $sink0 
$ns_ connect $tcp0 $sink0 
set ftp0 [new Application/FTP] 
$ftp0 attach-agent $tcp0 
$ns_ at 0.0 "$ftp0 start" 
 
$ns_ at 200.0 "$ftp0 stop" 
 
 
set tcp1 [new Agent/TCP] 
$tcp1 set class_ 2 
set sink1 [new Agent/TCPSink] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(4) $tcp1 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(16) $sink1 
$ns_ connect $tcp1 $sink1 
set ftp1 [new Application/FTP] 
$ftp1 attach-agent $tcp1 
$ns_ at 0.0 "$ftp1 start" 
 
#$ns_ at 200.0 "$ftp1 stop" 
 
# 
# Tell nodes when the simulation ends 
# 
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} { 
    $ns_ at $stopTime "$node_($i) reset"; 
} 
$ns_ at $stopTime "stop" 
$ns_ at $stopTime "puts \"NS EXITING...\" ; $ns_ halt" 
proc stop {} { 
    global ns_ tracefd namtrace 
    $ns_ flush-trace 
    close $tracefd 
    close $namtrace 
} 
 
puts "Starting Simulation..." 
$ns_ run 
